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Tolerating the “doubting Thomas”:
how centrality of religious beliefs vs.
practices influences prejudice
against atheists
Jeffrey Hughes 1*, Igor Grossmann 1* and Adam B. Cohen 2
1Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada, 2Department of Psychology, Arizona State
University, Tempe, AZ, USA
Past research has found a robust effect of prejudice against atheists in largely
Christian-dominated (belief-oriented) samples. We propose that religious centrality of
beliefs vs. practices influences attitudes toward atheists, such that religious groups
emphasizing beliefs perceive non-believers more negatively than believers, while
groups emphasizing practices perceive non-practicing individuals more negatively than
practicing individuals. Studies 1–2, in surveys of 41 countries, found that Muslims and
Protestants (belief-oriented) had more negative attitudes toward atheists than did Jews
and Hindus (practice-oriented). Study 3 experimentally manipulated a target individual’s
beliefs and practices. Protestants had more negative attitudes toward a non-believer
(vs. a believer), whereas Jews had more negative attitudes toward a non-practicing
individual (vs. a practicing individual, particularly when they had a Jewish background).
This research has implications for the psychology of religion, anti-atheist prejudice, and
cross-cultural attitudes regarding where dissent in beliefs or practices may be tolerated
or censured within religious groups.
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Introduction
Numerous studies have demonstrated prevalent negative attitudes toward atheists (Swan and
Heesacker, 2012; Gervais, 2013; Cook et al., 2015). For example, Americans rate atheists as the
top group that “does not at all agree with my vision of American society” (39.6%), above other
groups that are often targets of prejudice, such as homosexuals (22.6%) andMuslims (26.3%; Edgell
et al., 2006). Recent work suggests that prejudice—negative attitudes toward a group (Dovidio
and Gaertner, 2010)—toward atheists is largely driven by atheists’ lack of belief in a watchful,
moralizing God (Gervais et al., 2011; Gervais, 2013). However, research on atheist prejudice has
almost universally been conducted in the US, a country with a Protestant majority (and three-
quarters Christian; Pew Research Center, 2008); thus, while Christians have shown evidence of
anti-atheist attitudes (Jackson and Hunsberger, 1999), it is an open question whether the link
between religion and prejudice against atheists—and its underlying processes—would translate to
non-Christian samples around the world. This is an important question because not all religious
groups may share the American, Christian focus on beliefs.
Hughes et al. Religious beliefs vs. practices
Religion can be viewed as a form of culture (Snibbe and
Markus, 2002; Belzen, 2009; Shariff et al., 2010; Atkinson and
Whitehouse, 2011), with systematic cultural differences in the
extent religions emphasize beliefs or practices. Protestants place
a stronger emphasis on beliefs, whereas other religions, like
Judaism, are more practice-oriented (Cohen et al., 2003; Cohen
and Hill, 2007). It should be noted that this emphasis on beliefs
or practices, at the group level, is distinct from the beliefs or
practices to which any individual may adhere (Na et al., 2010;
Smaldino, 2014). Drawing from social identity theory (Tajfel and
Turner, 1979), this group-level emphasis on beliefs or practices
should differentially define who is perceived as a member of the
ingroup.
If atheists as a group are largely defined by their lack of
belief in God (Swan and Heesacker, 2012), then this lack of
belief should be more relevant for religions that place greater
importance on believing, and they should be more likely to be
perceived as outgroup members. In contrast, practice-oriented
religions should place less emphasis on lack of belief as a criteria
for ingroup membership. Thus, anti-atheist prejudice may be
much lower within practice-oriented religions than what the
previous research on US samples would suggest. We examine
this distinction in Studies 1 and 2. This contrast may also hold
for non-believing individuals who are perceived to be within
a religious community. Belief-oriented religions may be more
tolerant of a member who fails to participate in certain religious
practices, while practice-oriented religions may be more likely to
tolerate a non-believing “doubting Thomas” within their midst.
We explore this further in Study 3.
Much of the behavioral research concerning religious beliefs
and practices has focused its attention on Protestants and
Jews. For instance, when making judgments about religiosity,
Protestants place more emphasis than Jews on religious beliefs
(e.g., belief in God, belief in an afterlife), whereas Jews place
more emphasis on religious practices (e.g., attending religious
services, reading religious texts; Cohen et al., 2003). Moreover, in
practice-oriented (vs. belief-oriented) religions, group affiliation
and social connection are seen as integral parts of religious
identity (Cohen and Hill, 2007). As a result, practice-oriented
religions like Judaism are more likely to stress the importance
of heredity or an ethnic identity for one’s religious identity,
and place an emphasis on religious practices and rituals as a
means of maintaining group cohesiveness. The implication of
this is that the religious culture in which individuals reside
influences how they perceive their own religiosity. In a belief-
oriented religion, an individual who does not believe in God
may perceive herself as not very religious; in contrast, the same
individual in a practice-oriented religion may consider herself as
very religious, depending on how well she adheres to common
religious practices within that culture. In this sense, the group-
level emphasis on beliefs or practices is distinct from individual
adherence to beliefs and practices (Na et al., 2010; Smaldino,
2014), but still exerts influence on how individuals’ religiosity is
perceived by themselves and others.
To date, however, there has been little empirical research on
what other major religious groups emphasize. However there
is at least some evidence that Muslims, similar to Christians
(Cohen and Rozin, 2001), perceive the control of thoughts and
intentions to be relevant for moral judgments (Inozu et al., 2012).
Conversely, Hindus have been shown to judge even unintentional
harmful actions more harshly than Protestants, suggesting an
emphasis on acts rather than beliefs (Laurin and Plaks, 2014).
While the literature here is sparse, this at least suggests that
Muslims may be belief-oriented, while Hindus may be practice-
oriented. In the present paper, we extend research to these
two major religions and examine these assumptions directly in
Study 2.
Present Research
Using nationally representative surveys and experiments, three
studies examine attitudes of Protestant Christians (Studies 1–
3), Muslims (Study 2), Jews (Studies 1–3), and Hindus (Studies
1–2) toward atheists (Studies 1–2) and individuals who vary in
their beliefs and practices (Study 3). Given established differences
in cross-cultural religious emphases on beliefs and practices,
we hypothesized that predominantly belief-oriented religions
(Protestants and Muslims) would have more negative attitudes
toward atheists and non-believers. Conversely, predominantly
practice-oriented religions (Jews and Hindus) would have less
negative attitudes toward atheists, but more negative attitudes
toward non-practicing individuals—particularly when those
individuals are perceived to be hereditary/ethnic members of that
religion.
We also predicted that these results should be moderated
by self-assessments of one’s own religiosity. Previous research
in cultural psychology has found that the link between beliefs
and religiosity is stronger for Protestants than for Jews (Cohen
et al., 2003). In contrast, Jews’ religiosity is most strongly
linked with their religious practices. Thus, if Protestants consider
religiosity more in terms of beliefs as compared to practices,
then strongly religious (vs. less religious) Protestants should
show more negative attitudes toward atheists (non-believers);
in contrast, attitudes of members of predominantly practice-
oriented religions like Judaism and Hinduism toward atheists
should not be as strongly influenced by religiosity. Instead,
religiosity should moderate the attitudes of members of practice-
oriented religions toward non-practicing individuals.
Study 1
Study 1 provided an initial test of our hypothesis that attitudes
toward atheists would differ by religious group, using feeling
thermometer measures common in the prejudice literature (e.g.,
Dasgupta and Greenwald, 2001; Gervais et al., 2011). We also
examined political conservatism as a potential confound, and
assessed the moderating role of religiosity for these religious
differences.
Method
Sample
We recruited 100 American Protestants, 56 American Jews,
and 150 Indian Hindus from Amazon Mechanical Turk for
a study on “attitudes toward social groups” (see Table 1 for
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TABLE 1 | Demographics for studies 1–3.
N %Women Age % Completed college Religiosity Political conservatism Fundamentalism
STUDY 1
Protestants 100 50.0% 38.2 (14.8) 58.0% 4.84 (1.71) 4.4 (1.91) –
Jews 56 41.1% 31.8 (12.2) 63.6% 4.37 (1.79) 3.75 (1.84) –
Hindus 150 37.3% 30.7 (9.6) 89.3% 5.23 (1.46) 4.21 (1.61) –
STUDY 2
Protestants 12,188 57.7% 48.7 (17.4) 34.8% 4.43 (1.35) – 0.16 (0.36)
Muslims 2167 50.6% 39.7 (14.7) 16.4% 5.37 (1.22) – 0.50 (0.50)
Jews 1104 56.5% 45.2 (17.9) 40.0% 4.02 (1.61) – 0.46 (0.50)
Hindus 203 51.7% 43.0 (16.5) 26.6% 5.26 (1.11) – 0.11 (0.31)
STUDY 3
Protestants 311 42.8% – – – – –
Jews 271 45.8% – – – – –
Due to a technical error, age, and education were not collected for Study 3. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are displayed for age, religiosity, political conservatism, and
fundamentalism.
demographics). Sample size was determined in advance, and
we aimed for 100–150 participants for each religious group.
However, before examining the results, we ended collection
from Jewish participants early due to slow participation rates.
Participants were screened for their religion at the beginning
of the study. This study was carried out in accordance with
the recommendations of the Office of Research Ethics at
the University of Waterloo, with informed consent from all
participants in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Procedure
To provide a general measure of prejudice, participants first
rated atheists on a “feeling thermometer” from 0 to 100. This
measure was mixed in with feeling thermometers for several
other distractor groups, to make the critical measure less overt,
as well as one measuring their feelings toward “people in
general.” Next, participants rated the same groups on measures
of distrust and disgust, on scales from 0 (very untrustworthy
or very disgusting) to 100 (very trustworthy or very pleasant).
All items were then reverse-coded so high scores meant more
negative feelings, more distrust, and more disgust. A principal
component analysis supported a one-factor solution (67.51%
variance explained; all component loadings above 0.69); thus,
all three items were combined into a composite score of overall
negative attitudes (Cronbach’s α = 0.76). Finally, participants
completed demographics, including a measure of political beliefs
(from 1 = “liberal” to 7 = “conservative”) and a measure of
religiosity (“How religious and/or spiritual are you?” from 1 =
“not at all” to 7 = “very”; see Table 2 for correlations between
variables for all studies)1.
1Religiosity and spirituality may be conceptualized as two separate constructs.
However, it was not our particular research interest to study the differences
between self-reported religiosity and self-reported spirituality. To the extent that
either of these offer indications of participants’ adherence to particular sets of
beliefs and/or practices, these constructs should be positively related to each other.
Thus, this item may be seen as a rough composite of these two overlapping
constructs.
Results
Our primary prediction was that Protestants would report
higher levels of prejudice toward atheists than would Jews
or Hindus. To control for individual or group differences
in general positivity/negativity toward others, we included
participants’ feeling thermometer score for “people in general” as
a covariate. An ANCOVA revealed a significant effect of religious
background, F(2, 292) = 4.00, p = 0.02, η
2 = 0.027. These results
were significant and in the same direction without including the
covariate, F(2, 293) = 5.26, p = 0.006, η
2 = 0.036. As Figure 1
indicates, Protestants had more negative feelings toward atheists
(M = 52.21, SE = 2.29) than did Jews (M = 44.41, SE = 2.92),
t(148) = −2.00, p = 0.048; and Hindus (M = 43.95, SE = 1.47),
t(244) = −3.16, p = 0.002; while Jews and Hindus did not differ
from each other, t(194) = −0.15, p = 0.88. These results also
held when controlling for participants’ political conservatism,
F(2, 287) = 3.15, p = 0.04, η
2 = 0.022.
Religiosity significantly moderated the effect of religious
group, group × religiosity interaction: β = 0.33, t(286) =
2.85, p = 0.005. A weighted contrast comparing belief-oriented
religions (Protestants) to practice-oriented religions (Jews and
Hindus) showed that more religious Protestants showed more
prejudice toward atheists than did less religious Protestants, β =
0.34, t(286) = 3.68, p < 0.001. However, religiosity did not
predict prejudice among members of practice-oriented religions,
β = 0.01, t(286) = 0.13, p = 0.90. At high levels of religiosity (+1
SD), members of belief-oriented religions displayed significantly
more prejudice toward atheists than members of practice-
oriented religions, β = 0.59, t(286) = 3.67, p < 0.001, but not at
low levels of religiosity (−1 SD), β = −0.06, t(286) = −0.38, p =
0.71 (see Supplementary Material for more detailed analyses).
Discussion
The results of Study 1 show that Protestants, who place greater
emphasis on beliefs relative to Jews and Hindus according
to previous research, had more negative attitudes toward
atheists. This is initial evidence that the emphasis a religious
group places on beliefs or practices may influence prejudice
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TABLE 2 | Correlation tables for studies 1–3.
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
STUDY 1
1. Jewish (d) 0.18 0.39 –
2. Hindu (d) 0.49 0.50 −0.46 –
3. Atheist neg. feelings 46.82 20.76 −0.05 −0.14 –
4. General neg. feelings 34.45 16.86 0.10 −0.17 0.30 –
5. Male (d) 0.57 0.50 −0.02 0.10 0.01 0.14 –
6. Age 33.35 12.41 −0.06 −0.21 0.10 −0.15 −0.10 –
7. Religiosity 4.95 1.63 −0.16 0.17 0.06 −0.26 0.00 0.14 –
8. Political conservatism 4.19 1.76 −0.12 0.01 0.09 −0.06 0.08 0.12 0.36 –
STUDY 2*
1. Jewish (d) 0.07 0.26 –
2. Hindu (d) 0.01 0.11 −0.03 –
3. Muslim (d) 0.14 0.35 −0.11 −0.05 –
4. Believes in God (d) 0.82 0.38 0.02 0.04 0.17 –
5. Religious attendance 4.21 2.74 −0.05 0.01 0.24 0.39 –
6. Atheist neg. feelings 3.07 1.22 −0.05 −0.07 0.23 0.22 0.27 –
7. Male (d) 0.43 0.50 0.00 0.01 0.05 −0.11 −0.04 0.00 –
8. Age 47.11 17.39 −0.03 −0.03 −0.17 0.01 −0.03 −0.01 0.01 –
9. Education 2.66 1.58 0.09 0.00 −0.15 −0.13 −0.11 −0.17 0.05 −0.17 –
10. Religiosity 4.55 1.40 −0.10 0.06 0.24 0.59 0.54 0.26 −0.09 0.03 −0.15 –
11. Fundamentalist (d) 0.23 0.42 0.15 −0.03 0.27 0.22 0.35 0.26 −0.01 −0.08 −0.16 0.31 –
STUDY 3
1. Participant Jewish (d) 0.47 0.50 –
2. Target Jewish (d) 0.51 0.50 −0.01 –
3. Target believes (d) 0.49 0.50 0.00 −0.06 –
4. Target practices (d) 0.48 0.50 0.01 −0.01 −0.02 –
5. Neg. feelings 36.98 22.01 0.02 −0.08 −0.31 −0.09 –
6. Male (d) 0.56 0.50 −0.03 −0.01 0.02 −0.02 0.04 –
Bolded values are significant at the p < 0.05 level. Variables followed by “(d)” are dummy-coded (i.e., 0 or 1).
*Correlations in Study 2 shown here do not take into account country-level variation and thus should be interpreted with caution.
toward non-believers. These results held even after controlling
for baseline differences in liking for people in general. The
differences in attitudes were also not due to differences in
political conservatism, which has been previously linked with
anti-atheist prejudice (Edgell et al., 2006) and prejudice more
broadly (Terrizzi et al., 2010). In addition, the results of Study
1 provide preliminary evidence that religiosity may moderate
these results: for belief-oriented religions, religiosity predicted
more negative attitudes, whereas for practice-oriented religions,
religiosity had no effect. We test this interaction further in
Study 2.
Study 2
In Study 2, we aimed to replicate and extend Study 1 results
using the 2008 International Social Survey Programme: Religion
III (ISSP; ISSP Research Group, 2012), an international dataset
with nationally representative samples across 41 countries (see
Table S1). This allows us not only to extend our findings
beyond the US and India, but also to include a large sample
of Muslims, as a second belief-oriented religion along with
Protestants.
We also attempted to offer more direct empirical evidence
that the religious groups under study differ in their emphasis
on beliefs and practices. Past research on cross-religious
differences has shown that such group-level differences are
revealed in the extent to which beliefs and practices predict
self-reported religiosity (Cohen et al., 2003; Cohen and Hill,
2007). In essence, religious group members assess their own
religiosity by evaluating how much their beliefs and practices
accord with the beliefs and practices of their religious group.
The aggregation of these assessments offers an indication of
the group-level emphasis of beliefs and practices. For belief-
oriented religions, their beliefs–religiosity association should be
higher than their practices–religiosity association; for practice-
oriented religions, their practices–religiosity association should
be higher than their beliefs–religiosity association. Thus, to
directly test the emphases of these religious groups, we examined
how beliefs and practices predicted self-reported religiosity,
and whether these relationships were moderated by religious
group.
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FIGURE 1 | Negative feelings toward atheists, by participants’ religious
group membership. Error bars indicate ±1 SE. Different subscripts indicate
that these bars differ from each other at the p < 0.05 level.
Finally, we attempted to rule out a potential alternative
explanation concerning differences in religious fundamentalism
between religious groups, which has been previously linked with
prejudice toward a variety of stigmatized groups (Altemeyer and
Hunsberger, 1992; Hunsberger et al., 1999; Laythe et al., 2001,
2002).
Method
We screened for participants who identified as being Protestant
(n = 12,188), Muslim (n = 2167), Jewish (n = 1104), or Hindu
(n = 203; see Table 1 for demographics).
As a measure of attitudes toward atheists, we used one item,
“What is your personal attitude toward members of the following
religious groups? Atheists or non-believers” (1 = “very positive”
to 5= “very negative”).
To measure belief in God, one item was used, “What best
describes your beliefs about God?” with four response options:
“I don’t believe in God and I never have,” “I don’t believe in
God now, but I used to,” “I believe in God now, but I didn’t
used to,” and “I believe in God now and I always have.” These
were combined into two options indicating participants’ present
beliefs (0 = “currently does not believe” and 1 = “currently
believes”). For religious attendance, one item was used, “How
often do you visit a holy place for religious reasons such as
going to [shrine/temple/church/mosque]?” (1 = “Never” to 9 =
“Several times a week”). These variables were used to predict
self-reported religiosity, measured with one item, “Would you
describe yourself as... 1 = extremely non-religious to 7 =
extremely religious.”
To address the possibility that the association between
religious group and atheist attitudes was a result of differences
in religious fundamentalism, we examined responses to one item
asking participants whether truth is found in only one religion (1)
or inmany religions (0), one important aspect of fundamentalism
(Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 1992).
In the analyses for Study 2, we used a multilevel random
intercepts model with participants (Level 1) nested in countries
(Level 2) to control for between-country effects not associated
with religious group. Religious group was then dummy-coded,
TABLE 3 | Belief in/importance of God and attendance of religious
services, by religious group (Study 2).
Belief in God (0–1) Religious attendance (1–9)
Protestants 0.78a (0.41) 3.97a (2.57)
Muslims 0.97b (0.17) 5.87b (3.15)
Jews 0.85c (0.36) 3.74c (2.66)
Hindus 0.95b (0.22) 4.40a (2.48)
Values indicate group means, with standard deviation in parentheses. Subscripts for each
column indicate that these groups differed from each other, as indicated by a Dennett’s
modified Tukey-Kramer (DTK) multiple comparisons test, which accounts for uneven
sample sizes and variances.
with Muslims as the comparison group. Because of differing
sample sizes between groups leading to different within-group
variances, we used a diagonal covariance matrix to model
heterogeneous variance (Pinheiro and Bates, 2000). For assessing
how beliefs and practices predicted religiosity, we standardized
the measures of beliefs and practices, and modeled them with a
mixed effects analysis, so we could directly compare the slopes
of beliefs and practices in predicting religiosity, and whether
religious group moderated these comparisons.
Results
Beliefs, Practices, and Religiosity
As results in Table 3 show, Muslims and Hindus were most
likely to report belief in God, while Protestants were least likely.
Muslims had the highest level of religious attendance, while Jews
had the lowest.
We found a significant three-way interaction between
religion, item (dummy code indicating beliefs or practices), and
value (within-person, continuous measure of beliefs/practices),
F(3, 28128) = 6.20, p < 0.001, R
2 = 0.283 (Lefcheck, 2013;
Nakagawa and Schielzeth, 2013). Within each religion, the two-
way interactions showed that Protestants placed more emphasis
on beliefs than on practices, β = 0.14, t(28128) = 12.68, p <
0.001; as did Muslims, β = 0.24, t(28128) = 5.01, p < 0.001.
In contrast, Jews placed equal emphasis on beliefs and practices,
β = −0.04, t(28128) = −0.78, p = 0.43; as did Hindus, β = 0.04,
t(28128) = 0.34, p = 0.73 (see Figure 2 and Table 4).
In addition to this analysis, we used a weighted contrast
to further account for differing sample sizes. This contrast
compared Muslims and Protestants as a group to Jews and
Hindus as a group.When taken together, belief-oriented religions
placed greater emphasis on beliefs over practices, while practice-
oriented religions did not; interaction: β = 0.18, t(28128) = 3.90,
p < 0.001.
Attitudes toward Atheists
Replicating Study 1, we found a significant overall effect of
religious group on attitudes toward atheists, F(3, 8236) = 17.26,
p < 0.001, R2 = 0.017. As shown in Table 4, Muslims had more
negative attitudes toward atheists compared to Jews, β = −0.50,
t(8236) = −3.67, p < 0.001, and Hindus, β = −0.64, t(8236) = −
5.76, p < 0.001, but did not differ from Protestants, β = −0.07,
t(8236) = −1.13, p = 0.26. Jews had less negative attitudes than
Protestants, β = 0.42, t(8236) = 3.48, p < 0.001, as did Hindus,
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β = 0.57, t(8236) = 6.13, p < 0.001, but Jews and Hindus did
not differ from each other, β = −0.14, t(8236) = −0.94, p = 0.35.
The same pattern of results held when simultaneously controlling
for age, gender, and education, F(3, 8158) = 16.88, p < 0.001,
R2 = 0.029. The pattern and significance of results also held
when excluding participants who indicated they did not believe
in God, F(3, 5917) = 15.73, p < 0.001, R
2 = 0.020. See also
the Supplementary Material for additional analyses regarding
Catholics.
Effect of Fundamentalism
Although fundamentalism itself predicted more negative
attitudes toward atheists, F(1, 7561) = 128.43, p < 0.001, adding
this variable as a fixed effect did not change the pattern of results
for religious group, F(3, 7561) = 17.01, p < 0.001, R
2 = 0.030.
Moderation of Religiosity
Finally, we assessed whether religiosity moderated the effects
of religious group on attitudes toward atheists. The overall
interaction was not significant, F(3, 8054) = 1.43, p = 0.23, R
2 =
0.042. However, the weighted contrast comparing Muslims and
Protestants together to Jews and Hindus together was marginally
significant, β = 0.16, t(8054) = 1.74, p = 0.08, though the effect
size was small. Religiosity predicted more negative attitudes for
FIGURE 2 | Differences in slopes for beliefs predicting religiosity and
practices predicting religiosity, by religious group. Asterisks indicate that
the difference in slopes is greater than zero. Different subscripts indicate that
these bars differ from each other at the p < 0.05 level.
Muslims and Protestants, β = 0.16, t(8054) = 13.43, p < 0.001;
however, it was not predictive of attitudes for Jews and Hindus,
β < 0.001, t(8054) = 0.01, p = 0.996.
Discussion
The results from Study 2 replicate those of Study 1 on a large-
scale, representative sample from a wide range of countries.
This indicates the robustness of the effect, wherein Muslims and
Protestants, who place greater emphasis on beliefs relative to Jews
and Hindus, report more negative attitudes toward atheists.
This study also rules out a potential alternative explanation
for the results. We found that the pattern of results held when
controlling for the belief that only one religion holds truth,
suggesting that the results are not simply due to differing levels
of religious fundamentalism between religious groups.
Finally, Study 2 also provides direct empirical support for
the notion that religious groups differ in their emphasis on
beliefs and practices. Although such differences have been shown
between Protestants and Jews (Cohen et al., 2003; Cohen and
Hill, 2007), this study is the first to demonstrate comparable
differences for Muslims and Hindus as well. Although we
cannot get a direct measure of group-level cultural differences
in the centrality of beliefs and practices, we used the association
between beliefs, practices, and religiosity to examine how group
members use beliefs and practices to assess their own religiosity,
i.e., to assess their cultural “fit.” By aggregating these assessments
via regression, we capture the group-level emphasis of beliefs and
practices.
In addition, religiositymoderated the effects of religious group
on anti-atheist prejudice, leading to more negative attitudes in
belief-oriented religions but not influencing attitudes in practice-
oriented religions. Although, the effect size was small, the fact
that religiosity had no impact on attitudes for Jews and Hindus
suggests that greater religiosity in a practice-oriented tradition
does not result in more negative attitudes toward atheists.
Taken together, the analyses on religiosity provide further
support to the idea that that it is the culture of these religious
groups and their differing emphases on beliefs and practices that
are responsible for the differences in anti-atheist prejudice.
Study 3
Studies 1–2 cumulatively suggest that Protestants and Muslims,
who place greater emphasis on beliefs relative to Jews and
Hindus, have more negative attitudes toward atheists. In Study
TABLE 4 | Beliefs and practices predicting religiosity, and negative attitudes toward atheists (Study 2).
Belief in God (slope predicting religiosity) Religious attendance (slope predicting
religiosity)
Religiosity Negative attitudes toward atheists
Protestants 0.57 0.43 4.43 (1.35) 2.96 (1.13)
Muslims 0.50 0.26 5.27 (1.22) 3.68 (1.40)
Jews 0.65 0.69 4.02 (1.61) 2.34 (0.92)
Hindus 0.36 0.33 5.26 (1.11) 2.46 (1.36)
Slopes for belief in God and religious attendance are standardized coefficients of each variable predicting religiosity (1–7 scale). Values for religiosity and negative attitudes toward
atheists are group means, with standard deviation in parentheses.
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3, we wanted to directly examine the information that members
of religious groups use to evaluate a target individual, to further
strengthen our argument that beliefs and practices are the critical
ingredients. Thus, we experimentally manipulated the beliefs
and practices of a target individual to assess their influence on
the attitudes of religious individuals toward that target. Study 3
also avoided the use of the term “atheist,” to avoid stereotypic
reactions to the label itself (Swan and Heesacker, 2012).
We predicted that Protestants would have less negative
attitudes toward a Christian believer (vs. non-believer). In
contrast, Jews would have less negative attitudes toward a
practicing (vs. non-practicing) Jew.
Method
Sample
We recruited 311 American Protestants and 271 American Jews
from Mechanical Turk for a study about “first impressions of
individuals” (see Table 1 for demographics). Sample size was
determined in advance, and we aimed for 300 participants for
each religious group. As in Study 1, participants were screened
for their religion at the beginning of the study. This study was
carried out in accordance with the recommendations of theOffice
of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo, with informed
consent from all participants in accordance with the Declaration
of Helsinki.
Procedure
Participants first read a short description about a target individual
who varied between-subjects on three dimensions: religious
upbringing (Christian vs. Jewish), beliefs (does vs. does not
believe), and practices (does vs. does not practice). Care was
taken to select beliefs and practices which were appropriate and
relevant for each religion, based upon pilot testing. The believing
and practicing target [Christian/Jewish] was described as follows:
Ruth grew up in a [Christian/Jewish] home. She is a teacher
at an elementary school in a large American city. She enjoys
the process of developing teaching plans, but also appreciates
the chance to help students learn and develop. When asked
about her religious beliefs, Ruth says that she believes in
God, in an afterlife, and believes that [Jesus died and rose
again / the Torah came from God]. She attends her local
[church/synagogue] regularly, and participates in all major
[Christian/Jewish] holidays.
The descriptions for the non-believing targets listed the same
beliefs, but indicated instead that the target did not believe them.
Similarly, the descriptions for the non-practicing targets listed
the same practices, but indicated that the target did not practice
them. Subsequently, participants were asked five questions on
a scale from 0 to 100: how they felt toward Ruth in general,
how much they liked Ruth, how similar they and Ruth were,
how trustworthy Ruth was, and how disgusting/pleasant Ruth
was. These measures were reverse-coded so that higher scores
indicated more negative attitudes.
In contrast to Study 1 results, a principal components analysis
of the five attitude items revealed that the measure of disgust very
clearly loaded on a separate factor from the remaining four items
FIGURE 3 | Negative feelings toward target, by target religion and
target level of beliefs (Protestant participants only). Error bars
indicate ±1 SE. Different subscripts indicate that these bars differ from each
other at the p < 0.05 level.
(first factor eigenvalue= 3.23, 64.55% variance explained; second
factor eigenvalue = 1.00, 19.99% variance explained; all items
had loadings above 0.81 on their respective components). One
notable difference between Study 1 and Study 3 was the change in
target from a group to an individual. Participants may have found
it less intuitive to evaluate “how disgusting is Ruth” compared to
“how disgusting are atheists” as a group. However, the first four
attitude items (feelings, liking, similarity, and trust) showed high
reliability (α = 0.91), and hence were combined into a score of
general attitudes. We examined the measure of disgust separately
(see results in Supplementary Material).
Results
We predicted two Three-Way interactions, and two factorial
ANOVAs revealed the predicted interactions: participant
religion × target religion × target beliefs, F(1, 572) = 5.87,
p = 0.02, η2 = 0.009; and participant religion × target
religion × target practices, F(1, 572) = 4.13, p = 0.04,
η2 = 0.007. Given our primary interest in participant group
differences, we then analyzed the corresponding two-way
interactions separately for Protestants and Jews.
For Protestants, we found a two-way target religion ×
target beliefs interaction, F(1, 306) = 5.01, p = 0.03, η
2 =
0.012; however, the two-way target religion × target practices
interaction was not significant for Protestants, F(1, 306) = 0.41,
p = 0.52, η2 = 0.001. As Figure 3 indicates, Protestants felt less
negatively toward a Christian who believed than one who did not
believe, F(1, 148) = 63.51, p < 0.001, η
2 = 0.300 (see Table 5).
They similarly rated a believing Jew less negatively than a non-
believing Jew, F(1, 158) = 32.17, p < 0.001, η
2 = 0.169, though
this effect was about half the magnitude.
For Jews, the opposite pattern occurred. The two-way target
religion× target beliefs interaction was not significant, F(1, 266) =
1.51, p = 0.22, η2 = 0.005; but the two-way target religion ×
target practices interaction was significant, F(1, 266) = 5.37, p =
0.02, η2 = 0.019. As Figure 4 indicates, Jews felt less negatively
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TABLE 5 | Negative attitudes and disgust toward target individual
(Study 3).
Christian target Jewish target
Beliefs No beliefs Beliefs No beliefs
NEGATIVE ATTITUDES
Protestant participants
Practices 21.17 (3.17) 43.96 (3.17) 27.96 (3.54) 41.24 (3.34)
No practices 23.07 (3.44) 55.79 (3.34) 28.76 (2.96) 49.15 (2.96)
Jewish participants
Practices 42.20 (3.93) 45.43 (3.49) 26.21 (3.39) 32.80 (3.30)
No practices 40.09 (2.92) 39.67 (3.79) 31.87 (4.18) 39.78 (3.13)
DISGUST
Protestant participants
Practices 34.15 (5.83) 45.00 (5.83) 38.88 (6.52) 52.22 (6.15)
No practices 55.79 (6.33) 47.72 (6.15) 52.04 (5.44) 50.67 (5.44)
Jewish participants
Practices 53.73 (7.24) 49.94 (6.42) 48.06 (6.24) 46.35 (6.07)
No practices 57.32 (5.38) 47.86 (6.97) 35.96 (7.69) 57.02 (5.76)
Values indicate group means, with standard deviation in parentheses.
FIGURE 4 | Negative feelings toward target, by target religion and
target level of practices (Jewish participants only). Error bars indicate ±1
SE. Different subscripts indicate that these bars differ from each other at the
p < 0.05 level.
toward a Jew who practiced than one who did not, F(1, 134) =
4.41, p = 0.04, η2 = 0.032 (see Table 5); however, they did
not rate practicing and non-practicing Christians any differently,
F(1, 132) = 1.38, p = 0.24, η
2 = 0.010.
Discussion
In Study 3, we found evidence that both participants’ and targets’
levels of beliefs and practices influence attitudes toward those
targets. Protestants had less negative attitudes toward people who
believed (especially if they were Christian) than those who did
not, whereas Jews had less negative attitudes toward Jews who
practiced than those who did not.
These patterns reveal two key points. First, there is evidence
that Protestants used information about target beliefs in order to
rate attitudes toward her, whereas Jews instead used information
about target practices. Second, while Protestants’ attitudes were
more influenced by target beliefs when she was Christian (vs.
Jewish), in general Protestants used target beliefs to evaluate
her regardless of group membership. In contrast, Jews only
evaluated the target on the basis of practices if she was also Jewish,
suggesting a stronger role of heredity or ethnic identity for Jews.
General Discussion
Previous research has shown clear evidence of prejudice against
atheists in US samples (Edgell et al., 2006; Swan and Heesacker,
2012; Gervais, 2013). Given the social importance of these effects,
assessing how religiosity (including both beliefs and practices)
influences these evaluations is vital. Across three studies, we
showed how religious groups’ emphasis on beliefs vs. practices
influences attitudes toward atheists (Studies 1–2), as well as non-
believing and non-practicing individuals more generally (Study
3). Muslims and Protestants had more negative attitudes toward
atheists than did Jews or Hindus. Protestants also had more
positive attitudes toward believing vs. non-believing Christians,
whereas Jews had more positive attitudes toward practicing vs.
non-practicing Jews. Study 2 demonstrated that these religions
differ in the extent to which beliefs or practices are emphasized,
and thus participants’ own religiosity moderated their attitudes
toward atheists. This suggests that these varying attitudes are a
result of the match between a target’s beliefs and practices and
the cultural emphasis of a participant’s own religious tradition.
Currently, the preferred explanation for anti-atheist prejudice
relies on atheists being inherently untrustworthy because they
do not fear divine retribution (Gervais, 2013). In contrast,
the present work builds on social identity theory (Tajfel and
Turner, 1979), which would suggest that the emphasis on beliefs
vs. practices in a religious group differentially defines ingroup
members. If beliefs are used in belief-oriented religions to
determine who belongs in the ingroup, then atheists may not only
be perceived as part of the outgroup, but may also be particularly
threatening to the extent that they challenge the shared values
and beliefs that define the ingroup itself (Ritter and Preston,
2011; Cook et al., 2015). Thus, one area for future research could
examine how identification with the ingroup moderates the link
between belief-oriented religions and anti-atheist prejudice.
One interesting note about Study 3 is that Protestants
evaluated both Christians and Jews on the basis of their beliefs.
In contrast, Jews only used practices to evaluate the person when
she was Jewish. One possibility is that for Christians, endorsing
the correct set of core beliefs overrides religious background. In
contrast, Jews may be more likely to perceive engaging in the
right practices as a marker for their cultural identity, applying
such a standard only to those with a Jewish background. This
is consistent with previous research that shows that Jews are
more likely to emphasize heredity or an ethnic identity, marked
by particular rituals (Cohen and Hill, 2007). It would also be
consistent with research on ideology- vs. heritage-based identity,
which distinguishes between identity based on transcendent and
abstract values vs. traits and cultural traditions (Ditlmann et al.,
2011). Another important extension of this research, then, would
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be examining how belief- and practice-oriented religions differ in
their evaluation of other religious groups, and to what extent they
perceive them as part of the ingroup.
It is also interesting to note that despite the group-level
emphases by Protestants andMuslims on beliefs, and by Jews and
Hindus on practices, these do not necessarily result in reports
of greater belief in God by individual Protestants and Muslims,
nor do they necessarily result in more religious attendance by
individual Jews and Hindus. As previous work has shown, group-
or cultural-level processes do not always align with processes at
the individual level (Na et al., 2010; Smaldino, 2014). Future,
research should examine when and how the culture of a religious
group exerts influence on an individual’s attitudes and behaviors.
This process could be moderated by numerous factors, including
the aforementioned identification with the ingroup. It could also
be influenced by other prevailing cultural identities (e.g., racial or
ethnic identity, political identification) or more local norms (e.g.,
the beliefs of other members at one’s church or mosque).
Limitations
Although this research provides nuance to the previous research
showing prevalent negative attitudes toward atheists, it is not
without its limitations. First, in several cases the studies used
single-item measures (e.g., religiosity, fundamentalism) that
preclude the calculation of reliability. This limitation is at least
somewhat mitigated by the items’ face validity. Also of note,
our primary measures of attitudes toward atheists in Studies
1 and 3 were composite measures of multiple items. However,
future studies should better assess the moderating relationship of
religiosity using a more comprehensive scale to provide further
evidence that religiosity moderates the association between
religious group and attitudes toward atheists.
Second, our evidence for differing emphases on beliefs
and practices in Study 2 was limited by the use of a
dichotomous measure of beliefs. This methodological limitation
is a result of using secondary data analysis for which we
had no control over the item wording. The use of this
dichotomous measure serves to reduce the variance and, thus,
the power. The fact that we still found our predicted results
despite this methodological limitation is encouraging. However,
future studies should examine the relationships between beliefs,
practices, and religiosity using continuous measures and, ideally,
multiple-item composite measures.
Conclusion
Our research underscores the importance of accounting for the
culture-specific meaning of religiosity when examining religion-
related outcomes. This insight has numerous implications. First,
the criteria religious groups use to define membership may
influence how accepting they are toward outsiders: how such
lines are drawn may have ramifications for religious intergroup
hostility, of which negative attitudes are the first step (Allport,
1954; Duckitt, 2003). Second, criteria for membership may
influence what behaviors are acceptable or unacceptable within
the religious community itself. A religious group emphasizing
beliefs may be more tolerant toward deviance in practices (e.g., a
Christian not attending church) than one emphasizing practices.
Attitudes based on beliefs and practices also influence what
struggles religious group members may face when they realize
they no longer share certain beliefs or practices with the rest
of the group. Although, some religious groups may accept
a “doubting Thomas,” belief-oriented religions may have less
tolerance for such dissent than religions where practice defines
religiosity.
Supplementary Material
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found
online at: http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.
2015.01352
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